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An analysis of panel data on individuals in a random selection of urban households in Ethiopia 
reveals large, sustained, and unexplained earnings gaps between public and private, and formal 
and informal sectors over the period 1994-2004.  We have no formal evidence whether these 
gaps reflect segmentation of the labor market along either of these divides. In other words, we 
cannot show whether they are at least in part due to impediments to entry to the higher wage 
sector.   However, we do have evidence that, if segmentation explains any part of the observed 
earnings gaps, then it could only have weakened over the survey decade. We find, first, that the 
rate of mobility increased between the two pairs of sectors. Sample transition rates grew across 
survey waves, while state dependence in sector choice decreased. Second, the sensitivity of sector 
choice to earnings gaps increased over the same period.  In particular, the role of comparative 
earnings in selection into the informal sector was evident through out the survey decade and 
increased in magnitude over the second half of the period. 
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In this paper we investigate the extent to which the structure of Ethiopia’s urban labor 
market might have changed since the early 1990s by looking at changes in the rate of 
workers’ mobility across sectors, in sectoral earnings gaps, and in the sensitivity of 
mobility rates to earnings differentials. The aim is to see if these have changed in ways 
consistent with the market getting more or less segmented in the sense of the existence 
of entry barriers to relatively high paying sectors of employment. Our analysis is based 
on data from the 1994 to 2004 waves of the Ethiopia Urban Household Socio Economic 
Survey of the Addis Ababa University and the University of Gothenburg, Sweden.
2 
There are good enough theoretical reasons and anecdotes that could lead us to suspect 
that urban labor markets in low-income economies like Ethiopia’s are segmented along 
the lines indicated in this paper.  At the same time, there is consensus that the hypothesis 
of segmentation is difficult, if not impossible, to test formally in datasets like the one 
available to us.
3  We nonetheless think that the hypothesis provides a useful framework 
with the help of which one can analyze changes in the structure of labor markets. 
Although we cannot directly test its fundamental prediction that there are barriers to 
entry to certain sectors of the labor market, we can still interpret time series of mobility 
rates and wage gaps or the relationships thereof as indications of whether labor markets 
are getting more or less flexible. In other words, absent the possibility of segmentation, 
these same data would not be as interesting in terms of their implications for the 
structure or functioning of the market.  
 
Segmentation is indicated whenever there are persistent sector wage premiums that are 
unexplained in the sense that we cannot attribute them to selectivity or to differences in 
comparative advantage, unmeasured ability, job attributes or taste.
4 One hypothesized 
                                                 
1 This paper is based on an earlier version prepared as part of a World Bank study of Ethiopia’s urban 
labor markets (World Bank, 2007). We thank Jeni Klugman and Caterina Laderchi , for very useful 
comments on that and a subsequent version as well as for the support and guidance they provided to 
our work on the paper. 
2 As discussed in greater detail in section 2 these data are not statistically representative of labor 
market indicators for urban areas in Ethiopia as a whole. Those can be found, together with a thorough 
discussion of different labor market data sources for Ethiopia in World Bank (2007).  
3 Although the balance of studies has so far found evidence against the segmentation hypothesis, 
almost everyone rejecting it are quick to point out serious limitations of data or methods used in the 
analysis. 
4 Dickens and Lang (1985) define segmentation in terms of the interrelated phenomena of sustained 
and unexplained wage premiums arising from endogenous wage rigidities and the non-price rationing 
of “primary-sector” or high-wage jobs arising from it. Magnac (1991) defines a segmented labor   3
instance of it is between formal sector wage employment and own account work or 
informal sector employment.
5 A second is between public sector employees and private 
sector wage earners.
6  If segmentation does indeed exist along either of these divides, 
then it is also possible that some proportion of the unemployed have been rationed out 
of paid jobs or out of self-employment by non-price factors.  
 
Existing formal tests of segmentation rely on a host of restrictive assumptions including 
the log normality of potential earnings and the absence of state dependence in mobility 
costs, tastes and skills.
7  No attempt is therefore made in this paper to carry out any such 
tests, or formally establish if Ethiopia’s urban labor market is segmented.
8 Instead, we 
look at changes in variables that define segmentation with a view to assessing whether 
these changes would have strengthened or reduced it if it in fact existed over the survey 
period.  Unexplained and non-compensating wage differentials that cannot be attributed 
to differences in comparative advantage or to selectivity are sustainable only if the 
                                                                                                                                            
market as one in which a) rewards vary across sectors for equally productive workers and b) wages are 
rigid at least in one (-presumably the high-paying) sector of the labor market as a state in which equally 
productive worker are rewarded.   
 
5 The classic story of segmentation along the formal vs. informal dichotomy is Fields’ (1975) extension 
of the Harris -Todaro (1970) model of an underdeveloped economy’s labor market quantity-adjusting 
to shocks through changes in unemployment and rural-to-urban migration in the face of wage-rigidity.  
Stiglitz (1974), Shapiro and Stigliz (1984) and Bulow and Summers (1985) provide efficiency wage 
explanations to the wage-rigidity assumed in the Harris-Todaro model. The extension by Fields 
introduces job search costs that rural-to-urban migrants financed by entering a low wage, low 
productivity no-barrier-to entry sector upon arrival to towns. Both entry barriers and wage premiums 
are essential features of Fields’ model of segmentation. Rauch (1991) provides an alternative 
occupational-choice-cum-industrial-organization perspective to the modelling of the duality between 
the formal and the informal sectors of the economy. Although the dichotomy in Rauch’s model is 
defined in terms of departures from an optimal size distribution of firms rather than from an optimal 
distribution of workers and earnings per se, it also arises from (government imposed) price rigidity in 
the labor market.  
 
6 The large body of empirical work comparing pay rates between the two sectors is overwhelmingly 
focused on advanced economies, and is concerned not so much with labor market segmentation as with 
the import of pay gaps to public finances or to the ability of government agencies to attract skilled 
workers.  There has nonetheless been significant interest in public vs. private sector wage gaps in 
developing economies as well, partly out of similar policy concern as in advanced economies (e.g. 
Stevenson, 1992; Heller and Tait, 1994), and also in the context of testing the segmentation hypothesis 
(Lindauer, 1991). Examples include Lindaur and Sabot (1983) on Tanzania, Van der Gaag and 
Vijerberg (1988) on Cote d’Ivoire, Terrel on Haiti (1993), and Nielsen and Rosholm (2001) on Zambia. 
Regardless of their sign, unexplained and non-compensating public sector pay premia would be 
indicative of segmentation, since mobility must be impeded in one direction or the other for them to 
exist. 
 
7 Heckman and Hotz (1986) and Magnac (1991) discuss the assumptions in the context of the switching 
regression test proposed in Dickens and Lang (1985).  
8 On balance empirical studies of labor market studies on middle income developing economies  reject 
the segmentation hypothesis. See, for example, Magnac (1991) on Colombia, Maloney (1999) on 
Mexico, and Pratap and Quintin (2005) on Argentina.    4
mobility of workers across sectors is somehow impeded. An increase in the rate of 
workers’ mobility into high-wage sectors over the survey period would therefore indicate 
decrease in the degree of segmentation. In order to see if the rate of workers’ mobility 
has increased over the survey period, we compare sample transition matrices across 
survey waves. We also estimate dynamic binary sector choice models for four states, 
namely, unemployment, informal sector employment, self-employment, and public sector 
employment.
9 A decrease or an increase in the mobility of workers across sectors over 
time should be reflected in a decrease or an increase the degree of state dependence in 
sector choice, the parameter of state dependence being the coefficient of the initial state 
in the sorting equation. It is important in this context that the parameter of state 
dependence we estimate measures true state persistence rather than merely reflects 
unobserved individual heterogeneity. Even then true state dependence could be a 
consequence as much of state dependence in mobility costs, taste or skills as it could be 
of entry barriers, of which only the latter defines segmentation.
10 Still, if we can assume 
that mobility costs and the skill and taste distribution of workers remain the same over 
time, we can tell whether or not the market is getting more segmented by looking at what 
happens to the persistence parameter over the same period.
11  
 
Given that the rate of workers’ mobility is usually highly correlated with the size of 
sectoral earnings gaps, the change in the earnings gap itself is a second (alternative) 
indicator of change in the degree of segmentation. A third alternative indicator is change 
in the sensitivity of sector choice to earnings gaps. The less sensitive is state (or sector) 
choice to pay gaps, the more likely it is that mobility into the higher paying sector has 
been impeded. To look at these second set of indicators, we compute sector earnings 
differentials based on estimated sector specific earnings equations. The sensitivity of 
                                                 
9 For completeness one could also estimate a separate model of binary choice into formal private sector 
employment. However, the estimation would not add information to that the models of choice into 
unemployment, informal sector employment and public sector employment provide between them.  
10 Heckman and Hotz (1985) highlight the distinction  between mobility costs and entry barriers as an 
important issues in testing for segmentation.  
11 Maloney (1999) is probably the first to make use of mobility data in conjunction with post transition 
changes in earnings to test for segmentation.  Gong and van Soest (2002) build on this idea to jointly 
model earnings and inter-sectoral mobility and estimate  state dependence in sector choice as one of the 
test parameters of segmentation. Although we borrow from these two papers the idea of using mobility 
data, our goal here is less ambitious than theirs since we are not seeking to test for segmentation 
directly. We are in fact side stepping the task of testing for segmentation,  while asking whether our 
data are consistent with becoming more or less pronounced over the period of observation.   5




Our estimates imply large earnings differentials between the public and the private 
sectors of wage employment. In the absence of direct evidence on impediments to 
mobility, these differentials would not necessarily imply segmentation. Still, they should 
make the hypothesis of segmentation more credible in the Ethiopian context than it 
would otherwise be. At the same time, the sensitivity of sector choice to earnings gaps 
seems to have gone up in more recent waves of the survey, not only between the private 
and the public sectors of wage employment, but also between formal sector wage 
employment and the informal sector. In particular, the role of relative earnings in 
selection into the informal sector seems to have gone up substantially.   
 
These results suggest that, if Ethiopia’s urban labor market is indeed segmented along 
the public vs. private or formal vs. informal sector dichotomies, it has got less and less so 
since 1994. The raw transition matrices we compute from the survey sample support this 
conclusion as do the parameters of the dynamic sector choice models that we have 
estimated on the same dataset. We see from the raw transition matrices that, although 
there was little mobility across sectors prior to the 1997 wave of the survey, mobility 
rates increased considerably between 1997 and 2000. Mobility rates of the 2004 wave 
were also at least as high as those of the 2000 wave. The increase in the rates of mobility 
across sectors of employment was accompanied by a small but persistent decline in the 
sample rate of open unemployment. 
 
The increase in sample transition rates across survey waves is consistent with changes in 
state dependence parameters of the dynamic choice model that we estimate. The 
parameters are all positive and statistically significant in the equation for public sector 
employment, in the equation for informal sector employment and in the unemployment 
equation. At the same time, they have become smaller in more recent survey waves in 
each case.   
 
                                                 
12 Our approach here is similar to that of Gong and van Soest (2002), who estimate a dynamic 
structural sector choice model by using predicted wages (though not premiums) as one of the potential 
determinants of mobility between the formal and informal sectors.    6
The organization of the rest of the paper is as follows.  In the next section we describe 
our data.  Section 3 discusses patterns and rates of mobility across states in terms of raw 
transition matrices. Section 4 describes our estimation and testing framework. We 
present results of estimation of (reduced form) dynamic sector choice models in Section 
5, and those of their structural counterparts in Section 6. We conclude in Section 7. 
2 Data 
 
The first wave of the Ethiopia Urban Household Socio Economic Survey took place in 
1994. There have been four waves since then, one in each of the years 1995, 1997, 2000 
and 2004. Some 9,000 to 10,000 individuals in 1500 to 1600 households were covered in 
each of these waves. A major point of strength of the dataset generated by the survey is 
that it has a sizeable panel component. A significant proportion of the individuals 
covered in the first wave were also tracked by all four subsequent waves. An even higher 
proportion of them were covered by at least three waves. A weakness is that the survey 
samples were drawn exclusively from the country’s seven largest urban centers. While 
these account for the bulk of the urban sector of the economy, we would hesitate to 
project details of our results to the broader (national) urban labor market. The smaller 
towns may differ in terms of their labor market structure from the major centers covered 
by the survey. That said, we would be surprised if the more qualitative aspects of our 
conclusions did not hold by and large for the urban sector countrywide.  
 
Table 1 provides the breakdown of the survey sample by age groups and labor market 
states. In it we limit the labor force to those aged 15 to 64 years inclusive. This leads to a 
labor market participation rate of about 54%, which does not seem to have changed 
much over the decade spanned by the surveys. The table shows the division of the 
economically active between the unemployed, on the one hand, and the employed of 
various categories. The unemployed are defined as those household members of the 15-
64 age group who were not self-employed, or working for anyone else and were actively 
looking for paid work. Among the employed, the table distinguishes between the self-
employed and those working for someone else.   
 Self-employment is understood to include own account workers and owner manages of 
small businesses. We define formal sector employment as wage or salary employment in 
a private company, in a state-owned business or in a government agency. The term 
formal private sector worker refers to wage earners in private companies. We have put   7
family workers, domestic workers and casual laborers under the category ‘other private 
sector workers’. In the context of this paper the informal sector consists of the self-
employed and these ‘other private sector workers’.  We include in the ‘formal sector’ 
employees of private companies and the public sector.
 13 
  
We provide in table 2, descriptive statistics for monthly earnings, annual sales revenue of 
owned businesses and selected covariates of these and of labor market status. The 
covariates include age, gender, schooling, and occupation. Statistics are given by survey 
wave as well as for the observations pooled across waves.  With the exception of 
earnings and business sales revenue all variables in the table are dichotomous. Schooling 
is presented using two classifications of school attainment. One of these is fairly 
standard, needs little explanation, and is used to report the sample proportions of those 
who attained a particular level for the 1994, 1997 and 2000 waves. Unfortunately the 
same classification was not used in the 2004 wave of the survey, which distinguished only 
between those who had no education, those who had attained grade 10 or lower, those 
who had completed preparatory school, and those who had some tertiary education. 
Other covariates highlighted in the analysis include location of employment, ethnicity 
and family background variables, including parental schooling and parental occupation. 
3. Aggregate transition rates and patterns  
 
As a prelude to our analysis of the determinants of labor mobility, we describe in this 
section the patterns of mobility observed in the data in terms of sample transition 
matrices between employment and unemployment, and across three sectors of 
employment, namely, the public sector, formal private sector employment, and informal 
sector employment.  
 
                                                 
13 There is no employer size dimension to our definition of informality. People who have reported to 
be employees of a private sector organization or enterprise have all been classified here as formal 
sector workers. It is common to define informality in a way that takes into account the size of 
employers. There are a variety of operational definitions of informality with which our admittedly lose 
characterization is consistent. One definition identifies informality with lack of labor regulation (Pratap 
and Quintin, 2006). A second is in terms of employer size (Maloney 1999, Gong, van Soest and 
Villagomez, 2004). A third is in terms of the kind of work being done such as casual or piece rate work 
and also own account work, such as casual work or self employment (Magnac, 1991). A fourth 
alternative is to define firms as informal if they are  not legally registered (Bigsten, Kimuyu, Lundvall, 
2004)  
 
   8
There was not much transition across these sectors between the 1994 wave and the 1995 
wave, or between the 1995 wave and the 1997 wave. On the other hand, transition rates 
were relatively high between the 1994 wave and the 1997 wave,  the 1997 wave and the 
2000 wave,  and the 2000 wave and 2004 wave, and, as expected, even higher between 
any pair of waves that were further apart  by more than four years. We report the sample 
transition matrices for these pairings in table 3.  Two key patterns seem to emerge across 
the four waves. First, there was a small but statistically significant and persistent decline 
in the sample unemployment rate since the 1997 wave. Secondly, this was associated with 
an increase in the share of formal sector in employment.  
 
Unemployment transitions 
The probability of someone reporting unemployment in the 1994 sample landing a job or 
shifting to self-employment within a year was almost zero. However, the probability of 
someone in that state exiting unemployment increases as we expand the time horizon of 
observation. Panel a) of table 3 tracks the respondents of the 1994 wave through to the 
1997 wave. Although the table registers some movement out of unemployment, this 
occurs at  very low rates: less than 7 percent of those who were unemployed in the 1994 
sample had some form of employment by 1997. A little over a third of these went into 
formal sector wage employment.  
 
Things do change significantly over the next three years. By the 2000 wave, more than 
half of the unemployed of the 1994 sample had changed status (table 3, panel b). About 
one in eight had left the labor force altogether, presumably, having stopped looking for 
work. About one in five went into own account work or into informal wage 
employment. Another 11 percent got jobs in private firms. And approximately 9 percent 
landed public sector jobs, about one third of these being in state owned companies. By 
the 2004 wave, less than a third of the unemployed of the 1994 wave were still available 
for work (panel c). Of the rest, about 23 % left the labor force; some 19 % joined the 
informal sector (in self-employment or in informal wage contracts); 17 % landed jobs in 
private firms; and about 12 % got public sector jobs. 
 
There are some interesting comparisons of rates of transition out of unemployment 
between the periods 1994-1997 and 1997-2000. The rate of absorption of the 
unemployed into the formal sector increased from 2 % to 18 %. The rate of absorption   9
by the informal sector (both self-employment and wage contracts) increased from about 
5% to 19%. The rate of absorption by the public sector increased from under 1% to 
almost 8%. The rate of absorption by the formal private sector increased from under 2% 
to about 10%. 
 
The relatively high rates of transition from unemployment during the period 1997-2000 
were also sustained in the next four years. The probability of someone reporting 
unemployment in the 2000 sample taking up some form of employment by the time of 
the 2004 survey was 41 percent. This is significantly higher than the corresponding 
transition rate for the period 1997-2000, but by an amount that could be explained 




Informal sector/self-employment transitions  
Like rates of transitions out of unemployment, probabilities of transitions between the 
formal and informal sectors of employment would seem to be negligible over any given 
year. But, again, the probability of transition rises significantly when we expand the time 
horizon by three more years (table 3, panel b). This is largely on account of movement of 
workers to the private formal sector. The probability that someone reporting self-
employment or informal employment in the 1994 survey would have joined the public 
sector by the 2000 survey was only 5 %. The probability that the same individual would 
have taken up a job in a private firm was about 15 %. These probabilities do not change 
much as we expand the horizon further to 10 years (table 3, panel c).  
 
                                                 
14 Other related transition rates of interest for the years 2000-2004 are the following: About 24 % of 
the unemployed of 2000 sample landed formal sector jobs by 2004; another 17 % became self-
employed, or entered into informal job contracts; some 13 % joined private firms; about 11 % joined 
the public sector. To illustrate the origins of the unemployed, some 17 % of those who were out of the 
labor force in the 2000 sample joined the unemployment pool by 2004 (table 3, panel e). Given that the 
out-of-the-labor force group is by far the largest category of survey respondents in any year, this 
suggests that fresh entry into the labor force must be the largest source of entry into unemployment in 
the economies from which the sample was drawn. The second largest source were private sector job 
losses were the second important source of gross addition to employment for the same period. The 
probability of a formal private sector job loss was 14 %. The probability of an informal sector job loss 
was even higher at 17%. This contrasts with 7-8 % rate of public sector job losses. Given that there 
were more private sector employees than there were public sector workers in the 2000 sample, a larger 
proportion of the unemployed of 2004 must have come from the private sector than did from the public 
sector. 
   10
To see if the rate of mobility from informal sector employment to formal sector jobs has 
increased over time, we again compare panel a, which captures transitions over 1994-
1997 with panel d, which relates to 1997-2000. As is the case with transitions from 
unemployment to employment, there was a drastic change here also: the probability of 
transition from informal sector wage employment to formal sector jobs rose from less 




Public sector transitions 
There was a 48% chance that someone who worked for the government (as opposed to a 
state owned company) in the 1994 sample would have left that particular sector by 2004. 
We arrive at this rate by adding the following probabilities from panel c: that the person 
retired or otherwise left the labor force (20.5%); that they were laid off or pensioned off 
but did not leave the labor force (10%); and that they joined the private sector (17%). 
More than half of those who moved to the private sector would have worked for a 
formal sector firm. The corresponding probabilities of transition for a public enterprise 
worker were: 35% of leaving the labor force, 10% of being unemployed, and 16% of 
joining the private sector. Two-thirds of those joining the private sector would have 
joined a formal sector firm. 
 
These rates reflect more the higher transition probabilities of the intervals between the 
fourth and fifth (2000-2004) and the third and fourth (1997-2000) waves of the survey 
(panel d and panel e) than the rates of the first three waves. As can be seen from panel a 
there was practically no movement from the public sector during the interval between 
the first and the third waves (1994-1997). On the other hand, there was a 12 % chance 
that someone who was a government employee in 2000 would have joined the private 
sector in self-employment (4 %) or as an employee (8%) by 2004. The probability of a 
                                                 
15 To illustrate where the informally employed come from, more than one in ten of people who were 
out of the labor force in the 2000 sample would have become informal sector wage worker or self-
employed by 2004. And just under 20% of those who were unemployed in the 2000 sample would be 
self employed or in informal wage work by 2004. These rates are much larger than the probability of 
transition from the formal sector. Because the combined share of the out-of-the labor force and the 
unemployed was 60% of the full sample of individuals in the 2000 sample, this means that by far the 
largest fraction of those who joined the informal sector by 2004 could only have come from these 
sources. Indeed, the probability that anyone who had a formal sector job in  the 2000 sample would be 
found in self employment or in informal paid jobs in 2004 was quite low, standing at 6% for a 
government worker, at 8% for a public enterprise employee, and at 12 % for an employee of a private 
firm.  
   11
public enterprise employee in the 2000 sample moving to the private sector by 2004 was 
even higher, at 19%.
16  
 
4 Estimation and testing   
 
Suppose we would like to know whether the labor market is getting more or less 
segmented between any two sectors over time: say, formal sector wage employment vs. 
informal sector employment. One way of investigating this is to see if the probability that 
anyone who starts out in the informal sector in year  1 − t  will have remained in the same 
sector in year t has increased, decreased, or remained the same over time. The more 
mobile are workers across any divide, the poorer is status at time  1 − t  as a predictor of 
status at timet. A way of measuring changes in the degree of segmentation is therefore 
to use changes over time in the extent of state dependence in sector choice. In doing so 
we leave open the possibility that mobility costs are state dependent in the sense, for 
example, that prospective entrants to formal sector or public sector employment might 
have to migrate from elsewhere at significant transport costs, while similar costs could be 
sunk or entirely absent for those already in those sectors. We also allow for the 
possibility of sector “scarring effects” as defined below as well as for skill formation and 
skill depreciation rates to vary by labor market state. As already noted, any of these 
factors would affect the rate of inter-sectoral mobility and, consequently, result in true 
state dependence in sector choice, but is not part of what defines market segmentation. 
 
In estimating the degree of state dependence based on our sample, we assume that the 
current distribution of individuals in terms of belonging to a sector or not is generated by 
the process 





















                                                 
16 Looking at transitions in the reverse direction, some 12 per cent of those who were working for 
private firms in the 2000 sample had joined the public sector by 2004. Some 9.5% of informal sector 
employees and 3 % of self-employees in the same sample moved to the public sector over the same 
period. Again these rates are much higher than the negligible transition probabilities between 1994 and 
1997, but are only a little higher than the rates for the period 1997-2000.  
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it X  is a vector of exogenous observable determinants of such status,  it ε  is a random 
variable summing up all unobservable influences on the same; β  and δ are constants; 
and  
*
it y  is a latent variable registering a threshold value of comparative earnings or of 
utility governing individual’s sector choice, or a critical value of a measure of entry 
barriers to which the choice is subject. Following most of the relevant empirical literature 
on labor market transitions, we assume that  it ε  is distributed normal with zero mean and 
constant variance
2
ε σ  .  There is state dependence in the process when 0 ≠ δ  , so that the 
probability  ) | ( ) | 1 Pr( it it it it X y E X y ≡ =  is a function of 1 − it y . In the present context we 
should expect δ  to be positive in the event of its being different from zero. In that case 
a larger value of δ  would imply greater state dependence in the sense that  1 − it y  would be 
a stronger predictor of it y .  
 
We use equation (1) to describe any one of four distinct processes in Ethiopia’s labor 
market: unemployment vs. employment in general, informal vs. formal sector 
employment, self-employment vs. wage employment, and public vs. private sector 
employment.   Suppose (1) relates to the unemployment process, where  1 = it y  if iis 
unemployed at timet, but  0 = it y  otherwise. In the literature on unemployment, a larger 
value of δ  could be a result of longer unemployment leading to loss of human capital 
through disuse, which would make the unemployed less attractive than the employed as 
job candidates (Pissarides, 1992). It could also reflect the “scarring effect” of 
unemployment if prospective employers use unemployment history as a rule for 
screening out inferior workers (Arulampalam et al. 2002, Phelps, 1972). A third 
possibility is that getting a new job involves a fixed relocation or transport cost that 
becomes sunk once incurred. While each of these three scenarios is consistent with 
competitive labor markets, a higher δ could also be the result of segmentation, that is, a 
result of barriers of entry into employment on the part of the unemployed, due to 
employment protection laws, the exercise of insider power as in Lindbeck and Snower 
(1986), or jobs being rationed via efficiency wage payment (as in Shapiro and Stiglitz, 
1984; and Bulow and Summers, 1986).   
 
Likewise, state dependence in the sorting of workers between the informal and formal 
sectors could also arise from segmentation (by entry barriers to the formal sector) or   13
from any one of the three “competitive” sources of state dependence listed above for the 
case of unemployment. If we let  1 = it y  when i is an informal sector worker, and 
0 = it y  otherwise, a larger value of δ could reflect the fact higher barriers of entry to the 
formal sector arising from the protection of formal sector jobs by law or via insider 
power, or some combination of formal sector efficiency wage payment (Stiglitz, 1974)  
and search costs of formal sector jobs  (Fields, 1975) in a Harris-Todaro setting (Harris 
and Todaro, 1970). This would be the segmentation scenario. Alternatively, a large 
δ might simply be caused by the fact that staying in the informal sector involves loss of 
skills relevant to formal sector employment or has some kind of scarring effect similar to 
that associated with unemployment, or because the informal sector workers would have 
to incur reallocation costs to formal sector jobs.  
 
Similarly, a higher value of δ  could reflect higher entry barriers to the public sector if 
equation (1) describes the allocation of workers between that sector and private firms.  
Public sector jobs are probably more often life time jobs than private sector jobs in many 
low-income economies. At the same time their availability for new entrants to the labor 
force is limited by government finances.  
 
Given any of the three binary sector choice situations discussed above, we would have 
no way of telling what component of the δ we might estimate for any of them reflects 
segmentation and what part does not. We can nonetheless tell if segmentation has 
increased, decreased or remained the same along any of the dichotomies by estimating δ  
over the various segments of the survey decade under an identifying assumption.  
Specifically, we assume that the distribution, across sectors, of mobility costs, skill 
formation/depreciation rates,  scarring effects, and other possible ‘competitive’ sources 
of state dependence across sectors does not change over the period of interest, so that 
the share of δ  that we can attribute to these sources is constant over time. A fall in the 
degree of state dependence in sector choice would then indicate decline in segmentation 
while an increase in the same would mean greater segmentation. 
  
However, this is only one aspect of the problem of identification that we face in trying to 
estimate equation (1).  Segmentation or not, our estimate of δ  as a measure of true state 
dependence in general would be consistent only if the initial values, 0 i y , of labor market   14
states as observed at the start of the survey are exogenous (Heckman, 1981).
17  If  0 i y  is 
endogenous, a positive estimated value of δ  would signify wholly or partially what 
Heckman (1981) characterised as spurious state dependence, that is, as a case of upward 
bias that the endogeneity gives rise to in the estimation.  The initial condition would be 
exogenous only if (a)  it ε  are serially independent, and (b) the start of the survey coincides 
with the onset of the process itself.  The latter being unlikely the case, it is conventional 
to assume that  0 i y  is endogenous, determined as it is by the selection rules of the survey 
sample. The assumption that  it ε  is serially uncorrelated would also be unrealistic since it 
would rule out  it ε  including persistent individual effects. Yet such effects could well be 
present since we are unlikely to observe all potential determinants of sector choice or the 
all the constraints under which it is made. Unobserved heterogeneity of this kind 
generate serial correlation in the error term, which in turn produces correlation between 
the error term and  1 − it y  and 0 i y . We will therefore think of  it ε as consisting of two 
components: a term summing up persistent elements of unobserved heterogeneity, i c , 
that is potentially correlated with  0 i y , and an i.i.d component,  it u  uncorrelated with  0 i y , 
1 − it y  and it X  such that  
(2)                 it i it u c + = ε  
 









= , The 
correlation between  i c  and  0 i y  in turn biases δ upwards (Stewart, 2005). Heckman 
(1981), Arulampalam et al. (2000), Wooldridge (2005), and Stewart (2005), discuss 
alternative ways of avoiding this bias. Heckman’s estimator involves estimating (1) jointly 
with a probit model for the initial condition 
 (3)                 ) 0 ( 1 0 > + = i i i u W y γ  
where  i W  is a vector of exogenous variables including pre-survey characteristics of the 
sample not included in  it X   possibly along with some of the exogenous elements of  it X , 
γ  is a vector of constants, and  i u  is a normal error term uncorrelated with  it u , but 
                                                 
17 Consistent estimation would also be possible with serially uncorrelated errors if it can be assumed 
that the process is in equilibrium at the start of the survey. However, the later assumption would be 
unrealistic as it excludes the time varying exogenous variables from the process (Heckman, 1981).    15
possibly correlated with  i c .  Heckman’s estimator is obtained by maximizing the 
likelihood of  ) ,..., ..., , ( , 1 0 iT it i i y y y y  conditional on  ) , ( i it Z X as given by (1) to (3), while 
treating  i c  as random effects.  The reason for the random effects formulation is that 
MLEs of parameters of (1) would be biased for any finite time series length, T, of the 
panel under the assumption of fixed effects.  On the other hand, MLEs of parameters of 
(1) are consistent as the cross-section size, N, tends to infinity for given series length if 
individual effects are random (Heckman, 1981).
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Treating  i c  as random effects in turn amounts to assuming that they are uncorrelated 
with observable influences on
*
it y . This, however, is not as restrictive as it might seem. It 
can be relaxed by assuming that   i c  is a linear combination of time means,  i X ,of the 
time varying elements of  it X , and a random effects component  i α  distributed normal 
with mean zero and variance 
2
a σ  , but assumed to be uncorrelated with  it X  such that 
i i i X c α λ + =  (Wooldridge 2000). In that case the primary equation of Heckman’s 
estimator should be written as the following random effects probit:
19 
 (4)                ) 0 ( 1 1 > + + + + = − it i i it it it u X y X y α λ δ β  
Heckman’s estimator deals with the initial condition problem of identification of true 
state dependence by instrumenting the initial conditions, that is, by maximizing the joint 
likelihood of i it iT it i i W X y y y y , | ) ,..., ..., , ( , 1 0 .  Wooldridge (2000, 2005), proposes an 
alternative estimator that maximizes the joint likelihood of 0 , 1 , | ) ,..., ..., ( i it iT it i y X y y y , 
that is, maximizes the post-initial sub sample conditional on the initial condition and 
exogenous covariates of it y . The underlying idea is that, if  0 i y  is endogenous while  it u  is 
serially uncorrelated, then  i c  must be correlated with  0 i y . Since  there can also be 
exogenous covariates of  0 i y  that may produce individual effects independently of their 
influence on initial conditions, Wooldridge assumes that  i i i i a Z y c + + = π π 0 0 , where 
i Z  are elements of  i W  correlated with  i c  independently of  0 i y , and  i a  is distributed 
                                                 
18  See Wooldridge (2000), Hsiao (2003) and Stewart (2005) for reviews of the literature on consistent 
estimation of state dependence in the context of a probit model with unobserved heterogeneity.  
19  This is as opposed to the traditional random effects probit defined by equations (1) and (2).   16
normal with zero mean and variance 
2
a σ  so that the likelihood function is written in 
terms of   
 (5)                 ) 0 ( 1 0 0 1 > + + + + + = − it i i i it it it u a Z y y X y π π δ β  
Again the likelihood is maximized by treating  i a  as random effects. 
Because it is easier to implement than Heckman’s estimator, we use Wooldridge’s 
estimator. It turns out that the results that we obtain are quite similar to those we get by 
using a two stage procedure proposed by Arulampalam, Booth and Taylor (2000).
 20  The 
procedure estimates in two steps Heckman’s specification (Heckman, 1981) as given by 
equations (1) to (4) above. The first stage involves the estimation of (3) by maximum 
likelihood as a simple probit. In the second stage one estimates the following random 
effects probit by maximum likelihood: 
 (6)                 ) 0 ~ ˆ ( 1 1 1 > + + + + + = − it i i i it it it u v u b X y X y λ δ β  
where  i u ˆ is the generalized residual from the first stage probit, replacing the true error 
component  i u  in the equation  
 (7)                ) 0 ( 1 1 1 > + + + + + = − it i i i it it it u v u b X y X y λ δ β  and 
v ~  is such that  i i i i i a v u b v u b = + = + 1 1
~ ˆ .  
We can test for the endogeneity of initial conditions based on Wooldridge’s estimator by 
testing for the statistical significance of  0 π  in equation (5). The corresponds to the test 
for the statistical significance of  1 b  in equation (6) in the context of the two-step 
estimator. Since endogeneity is controlled for in each case, the estimate of δ we obtain 
by maximizing the log likelihood of the ample according to either equation should be 
consistent for true state dependence in choice into the labor market state of interest. In 
order to assess the merit of the two estimators relative to estimates from maximum 
likelihood estimates of a simple dynamic probit, or a traditional random effects probit 
that would assume the exogeneity of initial conditions, we have estimated equations (5) 
and (6) on the full five-wave panel over the period 1994-2004.  
 
The objective of the analysis being to gauge possible changes in δ  over the same period, 
we also estimate each specification over two consecutive segments of the decade, namely, 
the period 1994-2000 and the period 1997-2004. The panel consisting only of five waves, 
we had to choose overlapping periods in order to make sure that the estimation of δ  
                                                 
20  Henley (2004) is an example of more recent work using the two-step estimator.   17
controls for unobserved effects. As already noted the five survey years are 1994, 1995, 
1997, 2000 and 2004. This means the two periods overlap over the years 1997-2000. The 
value of  δ  therefore can change between the two periods only in as far as the value of 
δ  for 1994-1997 is different from the value of the same for 2000-2004.   
 
We would interpret a higher value of  δ  for the 1994-2000 observation than that for the 
1997-2004 observations as indication increase in the degree of segmentation of  the labor 
market over the survey decade. An alternative measure of change in the degree of 
segmentation is the corresponding change in the sensitivity of mobility to wage gaps that 
one observes over the period of interest. Considering equation (3),  let  it w  be the 
earnings of person i in the sector of current employment, and  it w0  the person’s 
potential earnings in the alternative sector. If workers respond to sector wage gaps in 
deciding where to work, then  it it w w 0 −  should be one of the determinants of 
employment status,  it y . We assume that the relationship between pay gaps and sector 
choice is such that  
 (8)                 ) 0 ) ( ( 1 1 0 1 > + + − = it it it it it Z w w a y ξ θ                                                           
where 1 a is a constant;  it Z1  is a vector of exogenous individual characteristics, θ  is a 
vector of parameters (including a constant term), and  it ξ  is a zero mean iid error term 
orthogonal to pay gaps and to  it Z1 .  The proposition that workers’ sector choice and 
mobility decisions depend on pay gaps can be tested by estimating equation (8) and 
testing for the statistical significance of  1 a . More importantly in the present context, an 
increase in  1 a  over time would suggest that segmentation has increased in the sense that 
mobility has become more and more sensitive to sectoral earnings gaps. Conversely, if 
segmentation grows over time in the sense that workers have become less responsive to 
pay gaps this should be reflected in  1 a  diminishing over time.  
 
A problem that has to be tackled in trying to estimate  1 a  on the basis of (8) is that, 
although each worker might have a reasonable idea of what they would earn in 
alternative states of employment, we can observe only one of these, which is the wages 
of current employment. A commonly used solution to this problem is to replace the 
unobserved wage by a counterfactual pay rate implied by an estimated earnings equation.   18
To obtain the estimates we assume that  it w  and  it w0  are linear in a set of parameters 
such that  
 (9)                 it it it X w 1 1 1 ζ + Π =                                                                                   
and 
 (10)                it it it X w 2 2 1 0 ζ + Π =                                                                                
where  it X1  is a vector of exogenous covariates of earnings,  1 Π  and  2 Π  are vectors of 
parameters (including constant terms), and  it 1 ζ  and  it 2 ζ  are iid error terms orthogonal to 
it X1 . 
 
The counterfactuals that one would compute based on the OLS estimation of equations 
(9) and (10) will be biased if there are unobservable worker attributes that induce workers 
to self select into either sector and at the same time enhance or reduce their earnings in 
the same sector. In order to avoid this bias we estimate the two equations having added a 
selectivity term based on the estimation of equation (6).  Let 
) ˆ (
) ˆ (










φ is the density function of  it ξ , Φthe corresponding cumulative distribution function, 
and  it y ˆ  is  predicted value of  it y that one would obtain from parameter estimates of 
equation (2) and 
) ˆ ( 1
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. We estimate the earnings equations by applying 
OLS to  
 (9b)                  it it it it y X w 1 1 1 1 ) ˆ ( ς σ + Λ + Π =                                                       
 and 
(10b)                  it it it it y X w 2 2 2 1 0 ) ˆ ( ς σ + Λ + Π =                                                    
where  1 σ  and  2 σ  are constants and  it 1 ς  and  it 2 ς  are iid error terms orthogonal to all 
other right hand side variables in their respective equations. The structural sector choice 
equation we actually estimate is  
 (8b)                ) 0 ) ˆ ˆ ( ( 1 1 0 1 > + + − = it it it it it v Z w w a y θ                                                        
where the hat symbol indicates estimates based on the estimation of (9b) and (10b). 
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5 State dependence in sector choice 
 
The most important finding emerging from our estimates of dynamic binary sector 
choice models is that, while there has always been state dependence along the three  
divides of Ethiopia’s urban labor market, it has grown significantly smaller over the 
survey decade. The estimates show that the probability of being in any one of the four 
sectors during a particular survey wave is higher for those who were in that state in the 
preceding wave, but this effect of last-period state on current choice has grown weaker in 
more recent waves. We interpret this as evidence that the rate of inter-sectoral mobility 
has increased over the years.  
 
Details of the finding are reported in tables 4, 5 and 6, where we estimate a dynamic 
probit for each of the four labor market states. The probit for informal employment is 
estimated under alternative definitions, namely, one in which we equate informal sector 
employment with self-employment, and a second in which the category also includes 
those who work for others under informal wage contracts. In the first panel of  table 4, 
we estimate a dynamic probit for each of the four labor market states on observations 
pulled across all five waves on the assumption that there are no unobserved individual 
effects and that the initial labor market state observed in the first wave of the survey is 
exogenous. Since neither is necessarily true in the light of the discussion in section 4, 
what we are reporting in the panel are estimates of a baseline model rather than estimates 
of the true data generating process.  
 
Indeed we do show that neither assumption is correct in table 5 with respect to our data. 
Table 5 is also where we compare the results of addressing the initial condition problem 
using the Wooldridge’s estimator and the two step estimator. As part of implementation 
of the latter we estimate a simple probit model of employment status at the time of the 
1994 wave of the survey and report it in the second panel of table 4. As a selectivity 
equation, this is identified by including family background variables in it having excluded 
them from the first panel and from the specifications in tables 5 and 6. The underlying 
assumption is that these variables affect current status only in as far as they influence 
initial conditions.  It turns out that both paternal occupation and maternal occupation are 
significant influences on initial conditions. Interestingly, individuals whose fathers owned 
non-farm businesses were less likely to be to be found in the public sector in 1994, but   20
they were also less likely to be unemployed, as they were more likely to be self-employed 
or to work for someone else in informal contracts. Also, maternal occupation did not 
seem to influence the chances of initial public sector employment. Those who had 
working mothers were more likely to be unemployed as they were less likely to work in 
the informal sector as employees or as own account workers. Surprisingly, parental 
education seems to be only weakly correlated with initial labor market status. 
 
The level of own education does influences the same status. Notably, those who had 
secondary education as the highest level of schooling were more likely to be unemployed 
in 1994 than those who had less schooling than that and those who had some tertiary 
education. This is in spite of the fact that there was no significant correlation between 
education and public sector employment, and reflects the fact that the more educated 
were less likely to be found in the informal sector or in self-employment at the time. 
Nevertheless, the public sector attracted the more skilled than the private sector in 1994 
while informal sector employment was associated with lower skills, when skills are 
measured in terms of broad occupation groups.  Gender and age were also significant 
factors in sector choice in 1994. In particular, women were more likely to be self-
employed. Public sector employment and self-employment were also positively 
correlated with age,  while the unemployed were predominantly in the 15-29 age group.     
 
Turning to table 5, we report Wooldridge’s estimator of each sector’s probit in the first 
panel, and the corresponding two-step estimates in the second panel.  Results of the first 
panel are obtained by estimating equation (5) by maximum likelihood. Those in the 
second are also maximum likelihood estimates of the specification given by (6). There is 
clear evidence of endogeneity of initial conditions in both panels. This can be seen in the 
fact that all coefficients of  1994 y  are statistically significant in the first panel. Likewise, the 
coefficients of the generalized residual of the initial status probit of the first stage are 
statistically significant. The fact that both sets of coefficients are positive means that the 
coefficients of  1 − t y  in the first panel of table 4 would be biased upwards for true state 
dependence due to the endogeneity of initial conditions. However, what is left when we 
remove the bias is still statistically significant: the coefficients of   1 − t y  are positive and 
significantly different from zero in both panels of table 5.  It is also clear that there are 
unobservable influences on sector choice beyond the observable factors controlled for in 
the table. However, the same unobservable variables happen to be highly correlated with   21
time variant observables, namely, education, age, and occupation. Indeed, there is no 
evidence of unobserved effects that are uncorrelated with those observables. This can be 
seen from our estimates of  a σ  and  v σ , which are reported in the first and second panels 
of the table, respectively, and are not statistically significant. 
 
Since estimation results are quite similar across the two panels of table 5, we confine 
ourselves to the use of Wooldridge’s estimator in table 6, where we compare state 
dependence in sector choice between the periods 1994-2000 and 1997-2004. As already 
noted, this amounts to comparing estimates for 1994-1997 with those for 2000-2004. 
The conclusion that state dependence in sector choice has diminished over time can be 
read from the first row of the table, where each coefficient in the first panel is 
significantly lower than the corresponding entry in the second panel. For example, the 
coefficient of  1 − t y  in column 1 is significantly smaller than the coefficient of the same in 
column 5, suggesting that the average unemployment duration for 2000-2004 was smaller 
than that for 1994-1997. Likewise, the coefficient of  1 − t y  in column 4 is significantly 
smaller than the corresponding coefficient in column 8, implying that past public sector 
employment was a weaker predictor of current public sector employment during the 
period 2000-2004 than it was during 1994-1997. The same can be said of informal 
employment in general and self-employment in particular: a history of employment in 
either form was a weaker predictor of being in the same type of employment in 2000-
2004 than it was in 1994-1997. 
21On the assumption that the combined effect  of 
competitive sources of true state dependence of sector choice has not changed 
significantly over the survey decade in all three cases, the observed fall in the persistence 
parameters over the same period can only indicate weakening segmentation if there are 
indeed entry barriers to formal sector employment in Ethiopia. 
6 Earnings gaps and sector choice 
 
We now turn to our second approach to gauging changes in the degree of segmentation, 
which is estimating the sensitivity of sector choice to sectoral earnings gaps. In tables 7, 
8, and 9 we report results of estimation of a structural mode (equation 8b) of the sorting 
of workers between the public and private sectors of wage employment. In column 4 of 
                                                 
21 At the same time, there is no evidence that the influence of any of the key observable determinants of 
labor market state has changed between the two periods. This includes gender, age and schooling. The only 
exception to this is that age effects in public sector employment seem to have come down significantly.   22
table 7, the model is estimated by maximum likelihood, on the formal sector employees 
sub-sample of the 2004 wave that were also covered in the 2000 wave. The earnings gap 
that enters the equation is obtained from sector specific earnings equations that we 
report in the first (public sector) and the second (private sector) columns of the same 
table. These are obtained by applying OLS to the specifications given by equations 9b 
and 10b, respectively. The selectivity terms of these columns are obtained from a binary 
dynamic public sector choice model of the same specification as column 6 of table 4-that 
is, as given by equation 5- but this time on data points of wage workers only. In the third 
column of the table we estimate a single earnings equation for both private and public 
sector workers having included a public sector dummy.  Since the dummy is assumed to 
be endogenous in this context, we include the generalized residual of equation 5 as a 
selectivity correction term in this column.  
 
Tables 8 and 9 are in similar to table 7 in content, in terms of underlying specification 
and identification and estimation methods. Table 8 reports results of estimation on data 
on wage earners in the 2000 survey sample who were also covered in the 1994 survey. 
Table 9 relates to wage earners of the 1997 wave who were also covered in the 1994 
wave.  
 
In table 10 the focus is on the estimation of a structural model of the sorting of workers 
between formal sector wage employment and informal employment. Here too the 
assumed structure is given by equation 8b. Since there are practically no earnings data for 
informal sector wage workers, we have been forced to confine the analysis to data on 
formal sector wage workers and own account workers reporting business sales revenue.  
We use the latter as a proxy for earnings from self employment.  What we refer to in the 
table as self-employment earnings premium is in fact the log difference between annual 
business revenue and the counterfactual annual wage, which we assume to be 
monotonically increasing in the true gap between earnings from self-employment and 
wages. The equations we estimate in table 10 are  very similar to those of tables 7 to 9 
except that we do not include a common earnings equation across the two divides in the 
case of table 10. The sector-specific earnings equations are identified and estimated in the 
same way in both sets of tables, as are the underlying reduced form selection equations. 
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Looking at the coefficients of the public sector dummy of the third column of tables 7 
through to 9, we see that there has been a sizeable public sector wage premium 
throughout the survey decade, which, if anything, has been growing over time. The 
implied public sector premium (at the mean of the wage distributions) was 49 % for 2004 
as compared to 40% for the year 2000 wave, and 32% for 1997. However, the 
coefficients of the public sector wage premium in the last columns of the three tables 
also suggest that the premium has become an increasingly more powerful driver of 
selection into public sector employment. Other things being the same, this would 
indicate diminishing segmentation over time, which is consistent with what we see both 
in terms of increase in raw transition rates and in the form of diminishing state 
dependence in selection into the public sector.  
 
It should perhaps be stressed that the public sector premium is computed over and 
above possible sector differences in rates of return to schooling and to market 
experience. It turns out that in spite of the positive public sector premium, the rate of 
return to observed human capital-i.e., to schooling and experience-was higher in the 
private sector in the 2000 wave. This was reversed quite drastically in the 2004 wave of 
the survey, for which public sector rates of return were significantly higher. This was in 
addition to the 49 percent residual public sector pay premium.
22 
 
Turning to table 10, the key finding that emerges from it is that engagement in the 
informal sector is the outcome of active choice based on comparative advantage for at 
least for some proportion of those found in the sector. The evidence for this is that the 
coefficient of relative earning in the last column of each of the three tables is always 
positive and statistically significant, suggesting that anticipated earnings gains are a driver 
of selection into informal sector employment. The size of the coefficient dropped 
precipitously between the 1997 and the 2000 waves, but then picked up in 2004 to more 
than  double of the estimate for the 2000 wave. 
 
This role of comparative advantage in informal sector employment could be concealed 
by the fact that schooling is negatively correlated with selection into self-employment. 
                                                 
22 We should hasten to add that this result applies to comparison at the mean of the distributions. It 
probably is the case that the public sector premium gets more pronounced towards the lower end of the 
distribution, but turns increasingly negative as we moved to upper quintiles.   
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However, it also turns out that the rate of return to education in informal sector 
employment that we read from the three tables is comparable to that of the formal 
sector. In other words, while the less educated have greater propensity for self-
employment, the more educated are more successful among the self-employed. 
   
7 Conclusion 
 
Based on data from the Ethiopia Urban Household Socio Economic Survey over the 
period 1994 to 2004, this paper has assessed the extent to which the structure of the 
urban labor market has changed over the same period. Specifically, we have looked at 
what has happened to entry rates to the public and the formal sectors of the labor market 
and to sectoral earnings premiums over the survey period, as well as to the sensitivity of 
inter-sectoral mobility to earnings gaps.  Our data show a large, persistent and 
unexplained public sector wage premium.  However, the sensitivity of sector choice to 
earnings gaps has become more pronounced, not only in relation to the public vs. private 
sector divide, but also vis-à-vis the formal and informal sector dichotomy.  In particular, 
the role of comparative earnings in selection into the informal sector has increased in 
recent years. The rate of workers’ mobility has also increased between the two pairs of 
sectors since the late 1990s as indicated by sample transitions rates.  More importantly, 
state dependence in sector choice has decreased. In other words, the fact that we observe 
a randomly chosen individual in a given labor market state today is becoming a less and 
less powerful predictor of the probability  that the individual will be found in the same 
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 Table 1:  Ethiopia Urban Socio-economic Survey, distribution of sample labor market state
                  (age group 15-64 only)
            1994             1995             1997             2000             2004
Labor market state Number          % Number           % Number           % Number           % Number         %
Self-employed 609 10.47 636 9.73 530 9.8 556 10.05 574 9.32
Government worker 523 8.99 561 8.58 469 8.67 453 8.19 548 8.9
Public enterprise worker 227 3.9 244 3.73 182 3.37 190 3.43 143 2.32
Formal private sector worker 239 4.11 251 3.84 233 4.31 372 6.72 561 9.11
Other private sector worker 516 8.87 586 8.97 482 8.91 536 9.69 615 9.99
Unemployed 1,075 18.48 1,140 17.44 938 17.35 926 16.73 1,021 16.58
Out of the labor force 2,627 45.17 3,118 47.71 2,573 47.59 2,501 45.19 2,695 43.77




 Table 2: Descriptive statistics for selected variables (age group 15-64 only)
1994 1997 2000 2004 Pooled 
 (all waves) 
Earnings and business sales revenue:
   Monthly wages (in log current Birr) 
                                       Mean  7.750 8.076 8.061 8.185 8.007 
                       Standard deviation  1.132 1.043 1.092 0.976 1.074 
   Annual business revenue (in log current Birr)
                                       Mean  9.758 9.440 9.562 9.376 9.395 
                       Standard deviation  1.920 1.801 1.740 2.044 1.924 
Occupation: 
Professional/technical  0.254 0.171 0.183 0.193 0.193 
Other admin/clerical/sales  0.234 0.139 0.218 0.182 0.182 
Skilled production  0.148 0.107 0.214 0.155 0.152 
Unskilled production  0.333 0.223 0.294 0.292 0.272 
Education (classification 1): 
Primary incomplete  0.161 0.161 0.124 0.121 
Primary complete  0.390 0.393 0.389 0.304 
Secondary complete  0.215 0.186 0.209 0.158 
Some tertiary education  0.059 0.051 0.061 0.087 0.062 
Education (classification 2): 
Grade 1-10  0.509 0.512 0.513 0.445 0.494 
Preparatory  0.257 0.228 0.209 0.250 0.235 
Demographics: 
Female  0.554 0.552 0.555 0.551 0.553 
Married  0.287 0.252 0.273 0.258 0.265 
Age 30-44 yrs.  0.239 0.241 0.225 0.224 0.234 
Age 45-54 yrs.  0.100 0.095 0.103 0.098 0.098 
Age 55-64 yrs.  0.062 0.068 0.066 0.066 0.066   28
Table 3. Transtions probabilities across sectors between survey waves (age group 15-64 only)
New status
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Total
Initial status
                 a.  Transition between the 1994 wave and the 1997 wave 
1. self-employed 94.7 0.2 0.4 0.2 0.6 1.3 2.5 100
2. government worker 0.7 97.3 0.0 0.7 0.0 0.5 0.9 100
3. public enterprise worker 1.2 0.0 92.9 1.8 0.0 0.0 4.1 100
4. formal private sector worker 0.0 0.5 1.0 94.4 0.0 1.5 2.5 100
5. other private sector worker 0.8 0.3 0.5 0.0 95.7 2.8 0.0 100
6. unemployed 1.5 0.6 0.3 1.7 2.4 93.2 0.3 100
7. out of the labor force 1.4 0.1 0.1 0.4 0.8 1.8 95.5 100
Total 10.6 9.4 3.6 4.6 8.9 18.8 44.1 100
                b. Transition between the 1994 wave and  the 2000 wave
1. self-employed 59.4 2.4 0.3 4.4 9.6 4.4 19.5 100
2. government worker 2.0 58.6 14.9 6.0 0.8 4.8 12.9 100
3. public enterprise worker 8.1 23.4 29.8 7.3 2.4 4.8 24.2 100
4. formal private sector worker 11.1 0.9 7.7 46.2 12.0 8.6 13.7 100
5. other private sector worker 11.4 2.1 2.1 14.9 40.4 14.2 14.9 100
6. unemployed 8.7 5.9 2.5 11.0 11.6 48.7 11.6 100
7. out of the labor force 7.9 3.4 1.9 4.5 5.1 19.0 58.1 100
Total 13.6 9.9 4.7 8.4 8.5 20.0 34.9 100
               c. Transition between the 1994 wave and the 2004 wave
1. self-employed 49.3 3.0 1.5 6.3 8.2 7.8 24.1 100
2. government worker 3.5 45.4 7.0 9.7 3.5 10.5 20.5 100
3. public enterprise worker 3.2 21.3 17.3 10.2 3.2 9.5 35.4 100
4. formal private sector worker 8.9 8.9 4.0 37.6 7.9 14.9 17.8 100
5. other private sector worker 15.7 4.7 1.2 12.2 32.0 9.3 25.0 100
6. unemployed 8.1 9.4 2.4 16.6 10.5 30.4 22.7 100
7. out of the labor force 8.5 6.1 2.0 9.0 6.7 20.4 47.3 100
Total 12.5 11.2 3.3 11.6 8.8 18.3 34.3 100
               d. Transition between the 1997 wave and the 2000 wave
1. self-employed 58.3 1.0 0.7 6.2 9.3 5.5 19.0 100
2. government worker 2.4 59.4 14.9 6.8 0.8 4.4 11.2 100
3. public enterprise worker 3.8 27.4 33.0 9.4 4.7 4.7 17.0 100
4. formal private sector worker 9.8 0.0 8.9 44.7 10.6 13.0 13.0 100
5. other private sector worker 9.9 3.1 1.9 12.4 40.4 15.5 16.8 100
6. unemployed 7.8 5.6 2.0 10.2 11.6 51.3 11.6 100
7. out of the labor force 7.2 3.2 1.2 4.0 4.7 16.9 62.8 100
Total 12.4 9.3 4.2 8.1 8.3 19.5 38.2 100
               e. Transition between the 2000 wave and the 2004 wave
1. self-employed 50.0 2.0 1.3 3.7 6.7 9.3 27.0 100
2. government worker 3.6 55.7 11.3 6.1 2.4 7.3 13.7 100
3. public enterprise worker 2.7 37.3 21.8 10.0 5.5 8.2 14.6 100
4. formal private sector worker 5.0 7.7 3.9 45.9 7.2 13.8 16.6 100
5. other private sector worker 8.7 8.2 1.4 14.9 26.9 16.4 23.6 100
6. unemployed 6.8 8.5 2.9 12.6 10.5 35.7 22.9 100
7. out of the labor force 5.9 4.0 1.1 6.3 4.5 16.9 61.4 100
Total 10.6 11.0 3.4 10.4 7.5 17.9 39.3 100  29
       Table 4: ML estimates of simple probit models of current and initial employment status, 1994-2004 
Dynamic pooled probit of current employment   Simple probit of employment status in 1994 
Status, Y  T 
Unemployed  Informal Self- Public  Unemployed Informal Self-  Public 
Sector  Employed Sector Sector employed  sector 
worker  worker worker worker 
(1)  (2)  (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Y  t-1  2.393 2.679  3.026 3.015
(48.89)**  (56.48)**  (51.42)** (49.87)**
Female -0.025 0.088  0.121 -0.022 -0.092 0.086 0.208  0.109
(0.52)  (1.81) (2.00)* (0.38) (1.50) (1.49) (3.13)** (1.62)
Married  -0.459 0.266  0.175 0.266 -0.325 -0.029 -0.456 -0.013
(3.47)** (2.20)*  (1.26) (1.97)* (1.06) (0.10) (1.51)  (0.04)
Age groups (reference group=Age 15-29): 
Age 30-44  -0.199 0.121  -0.073 0.393 -0.250 -0.023 0.207  0.023
(1.84)  (1.12) (0.54) (3.22)** (1.51) (0.14) (1.12)  (0.13)
Age 45-54  -0.184 -0.129 -0.191 0.282 -0.412 -0.145 0.092  0.045
(0.93)  (0.76) (0.98) (1.52) (1.25) (0.56) (0.34)  (0.16)
Age  55-64 0.277 0.015  0.114 -0.088 -0.564 0.275 0.293  -0.350
(0.88)  (0.06) (0.45) (0.31) (1.25) (0.88) (0.95)  (0.98)
Completed schooling (reference group=no formal 
 schooling or primary incomplete): 
Primary 0.386 -0.152 -0.355 -0.307 0.402 -0.302 -0.224 -0.046
(3.51)** (1.54) (2.89)** (2.32)* (1.49) (1.28) (0.85)  (0.16)
Secondary 0.656 -0.598 -0.204 -0.039 0.692 -0.670 -0.545 0.042
(5.30)** (5.02)** (1.32) (0.28) (2.12)* (2.13)* (1.38)  (0.12)
Some tertiary -0.031 -1.138 -1.053 0.535 0.311 -0.699 -0.929 0.351
(0.15)  (5.47)** (3.90)** (2.84)** (0.60) (1.29) (1.37)  (0.72)
Time (or group) means of 
time varying characteristics 
Married  0.187 -0.141 0.072 -0.266 -0.293 0.107 0.979  0.441
(1.21)  (1.02) (0.45) (1.72) (0.90) (0.36) (3.03)** (1.40)
Age 30-44  0.023 -0.013 0.363 -0.244 -0.158 0.053 0.328  0.736
(0.18)  (0.10) (2.31)* (1.66) (0.88) (0.31) (1.62)  (3.77)**
Age 45-54  0.101 0.077  0.508 -0.002 -0.088 0.136 0.582  0.786
(0.44)  (0.39) (2.25)* (0.01) (0.25) (0.49) (1.97)*  (2.57)* 
Age  55-64 -0.942 0.245  0.365 0.124 -0.302 0.175 0.894  0.859
(2.34)*  (0.85) (1.22) (0.37) (0.63) (0.52) (2.61)** (2.26)* 
Primary school  0.021 -0.239 0.187 0.562 0.466 -0.530 -0.106 0.466
(0.17)  (2.06)*  (1.31) (3.65)** (1.55) (2.03)* (0.37)  (1.42)
Secondary 0.064 -0.047 0.031 0.330 1.115 -1.087 -0.189 0.361
(0.46)  (0.34) (0.17) (2.03)* (3.13)** (3.15)** (0.44)  (0.92)
Some tertiary 0.438 0.653  1.082 -0.134 0.808 -0.719 0.800  0.350
(1.81)  (2.69)** (3.59)** (0.58) (1.44) (1.23) (1.11)  (0.66)
  Occupation groups 
Professional/technical  -1.602 -1.378 -1.468 0.998 -4.138 -2.185 -4.009 2.923
(5.86)** (5.78)** (4.57)** (5.83)** (10.16)** (6.84)** (6.85)** (13.95)** 
Admin/clerical  -1.348 -1.072 -1.323 0.593 -3.665 -1.590 -4.226 2.416
(6.43)** (5.53)** (4.52)** (3.80)** (12.11)** (6.06)** (7.42)** (12.91)** 
Skilled production  -1.124 -0.871 -1.386 0.592 -2.761 -1.073 -2.962 1.717
(5.31)** (5.25)** (4.84)** (3.76)** (9.35)** (5.15)** (7.74)** (9.30)**  30
 
  Table 4 continued: 
Pooled dynamic probit of current employment   Simple probit of employment status in 1994 
status, Y  t 
Unemployed  Informal sector Self Public sector  Unemployment Informal sector Self Public sector 
employment employment employment employment employment  emploment
(1)  (2)  (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Family background variables: 
         Fathers' schooling 
Primary -0.108 0.062 -0.030 -0.036
(0.83) (0.48) (0.20)  (0.25)
Secondary -0.307 0.200 -0.273 -0.316
(2.01)* (1.27) (1.27)  (1.72)
Some tertiary  -0.081 -0.214 -0.500 0.137
(0.30) (0.65) (1.00)  (0.47)
       Mother's schooling (completed: 
Primary 0.017 0.123 -0.065 -0.170
(0.08) (0.63) (0.28)  (0.74)
Secondary completed -0.478 0.358 0.597  0.367
(1.16) (0.89) (1.31)  (0.83)
      Father's occupation (reference group small farmer):
Non farm business owner/own account worker -0.203 0.314 0.592  -0.168
(2.05)* (3.50)** (6.16)** (1.58)
paternaloccupation==public sector worker -0.012 -0.005 0.087  0.078
(0.13) (0.05) (0.74)  (0.78)
Mother is a homemaker  -0.413 0.331 0.202  0.022
(6.58)** (5.81)** (3.21)** (0.33)
Ethnicity dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes 
Religion dummies Yes  Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes 
Year dummies Yes  Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes 
Constant -2.016 -0.722 -1.576 -2.374 -0.574 0.730 -0.824 -2.625
(15.27)**  (5.71)** (10.91)** (15.76)** (3.87)** (5.32)** (5.39)** (15.44)** 
Observations 8513  8513  8513 8513 3312 3312 3312  3312 
Log likelihood  -1910  -1881  -1239 -1289 -1251 -1479 -1176  -1081 
Pseudo R-sq. 0.63  0.66  0.72 0.72 0.40 0.32 0.30  0.39
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses 
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%   31
 Table 5: Estimates of dynamic random effects probits of current employment status, 1994-2004
  
                       Wooldridge's estimator Two-stage estimator 
      Current employment status=Yt                     Current employment status=Y  t 
Unemployed  Informal Self- Public Unemployed Informal Self- Public 
sector employed sector sector employed  sector 
worker worker worker worker 
(1)  (2)  (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Y  t-1  1.413 1.576 1.917 1.904 1.635 1.783 2.356  1.906
(12.88)**  (15.05)** (14.20)** (13.44)** (15.80)** (18.00)** (19.36)**  (13.94)** 
Y  1994  1.621 1.677 1.582 1.642
(14.13)**  (15.63)** (11.41)** (11.26)**
Generalized residual of 
initial status probit  0.783 0.834 0.628  0.906
(12.70)** (14.24)** (8.75)** (11.64)** 
Female -0.048  0.094 0.132 0.002 -0.085 0.122 0.175  0.062
(0.87)  (1.63) (1.88) (0.03) (1.53) (2.13)* (2.50)*  (0.90)
Married  -0.596  0.276 0.147 0.111 -0.597 0.280 0.111  0.109
(3.62)**  (1.82) (0.87) (0.67) (3.64)** (1.85) (0.66) (0.65)
Age groups (reference group=Age 15-29): 
Age 30-44 -0.313  0.115 -0.078 0.636 -0.302 0.110 -0.107 0.617
(2.45)*  (0.89) (0.49) (4.33)** (2.38)* (0.86) (0.67) (4.21)**
Age 45-54 -0.416  -0.107 -0.169 0.625 -0.444 -0.109 -0.203 0.607
(1.79)  (0.52) (0.75) (2.79)** (1.89) (0.53) (0.91) (2.71)**
Age  55-64 -0.005  -0.020 0.074 0.325 -0.022 0.026 0.074  0.274
(0.01)  (0.07) (0.25) (0.94) (0.06) (0.09) (0.26) (0.80)
Completed schooling (reference group=no formal education)
Primary 0.075 -0.034 -0.410 -0.166 0.062 -0.046 -0.438 -0.173
(0.52)  (0.27) (2.71)** (0.99) (0.44) (0.37) (2.94)** (1.03)
Secondary 0.603 -0.568 -0.251 -0.190 0.578 -0.561 -0.246 -0.213
(3.86)**  (3.86)** (1.33) (1.08) (3.71)** (3.83)** (1.30) (1.20)
Some tertiary 0.018 -0.940 -0.849 0.489 -0.027 -0.977 -0.918 0.478
(0.07)  (3.88)** (2.85)** (2.12)* (0.11) (3.95)** (3.02)** (2.07)* 
Time (or group) means of 
time varying characteristics 
Married  0.472 -0.227 0.022 -0.149 0.196 -0.153 0.241  0.037
(2.50)*  (1.33) (0.12) (0.79) (1.04) (0.90) (1.28) (0.19)
Age 30-44 0.185 -0.102 0.209 -0.514 -0.061 -0.032 0.414  -0.187
(1.21)  (0.68) (1.14) (2.92)** (0.41) (0.21) (2.25)*  (1.06)
Age 45-54 0.514 -0.127 0.353 -0.367 0.340 -0.118 0.600  0.008
(1.93)  (0.54) (1.36) (1.38) (1.26) (0.50) (2.34)*  (0.03)
Age  55-64 -0.566  0.199 0.299 -0.312 -0.957 0.354 0.663  0.025
(1.22)  (0.57) (0.85) (0.76) (1.98)* (1.02) (1.94) (0.06)
Primary school  0.144 -0.238 0.435 0.404 0.613 -0.726 0.266  0.612
(0.87)  (1.62) (2.47)* (2.04)* (3.68)** (4.94)** (1.54) (3.06)**
Secondary -0.115  0.027 0.161 0.554 0.759 -0.858 -0.125 0.742
(0.65)  (0.16) (0.76) (2.70)** (4.10)** (4.94)** (0.58) (3.57)**
Some tertiary 0.063 0.824 1.122 -0.096 0.677 0.172 1.027  0.217
(0.22)  (2.93)** (3.32)** (0.34) (2.34)* (0.60) (3.00)** (0.77)
  Occupation groups 
Professional/technical  -0.975  -1.578 -1.394 0.843 -2.352 -2.344 -2.043 2.257
(3.32)**  (5.31)** (3.66)** (4.03)** (6.91)** (7.14)** (4.96)** (9.36)**  32
Table 5 continued: 
  
                       Wooldridge's estimator Two-stage estimator 
      Current employment status=Yt                     Current employment status=Y  t 
Unemployed  Informal Self- Public Unemployed Informal Self- Public 
sector employed sector sector employed  sector 
worker worker worker worker 
(1)  (2)  (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Admin/clerical  -0.685  -1.049 -0.972 0.261 -2.002 -1.732 -1.723 1.451
(2.96)**  (4.51)** (3.10)** (1.38) (7.69)** (6.76)** (4.91)** (7.15)**
Skilled production  -1.235  -0.652 -1.246 0.382 -2.388 -1.149 -2.051 1.250
(4.62)**  (3.39)** (3.76)** (1.99)* (8.12)** (5.81)** (5.71)** (6.31)**
Mother' tongue:
Amharic 0.037 0.043 0.036 -0.038 0.081 -0.070 -0.103 0.068
(0.50)  (0.59) (0.43) (0.43) (1.11) (0.97) (1.23) (0.75)
Oromo 0.133 -0.215 -0.294 0.020 0.192 -0.305 -0.389 0.048
(1.56)  (2.52)* (2.87)** (0.19) (2.25)* (3.61)** (3.84)** (0.46)
Tigrawai  0.028 0.149 0.030 -0.113 0.110 0.041 -0.073 -0.143
(0.22)  (1.14) (0.20) (0.71) (0.84) (0.32) (0.49) (0.88)
   Religion: 
Orthodox Christian  0.000 -0.227 -0.256 0.183 0.081 -0.321 -0.293 0.206
(0.00)  (2.18)* (2.15)* (1.50) (0.77) (3.07)** (2.48)*  (1.69)
Muslim -0.080  0.001 -0.148 -0.007 0.007 -0.026 -0.120 -0.129
(0.60)  (0.01) (1.02) (0.04) (0.05) (0.20) (0.84) (0.75)
Town of residence (reference=Addis): 
Awasa  -0.247  -0.053 -0.147 0.251 -0.237 -0.115 -0.101 0.409
(1.93)  (0.40) (0.98) (1.75) (1.86) (0.88) (0.68) (2.81)**
Bahir Dar -0.100  -0.149 -0.034 0.293 -0.210 -0.162 -0.019 0.538
(0.67)  (1.00) (0.20) (1.86) (1.37) (1.10) (0.12) (3.46)**
Dessie  -0.080  -0.133 -0.065 -0.146 -0.168 -0.074 0.007  -0.133
(0.58)  (0.97) (0.42) (0.81) (1.24) (0.55) (0.05) (0.72)
Dire Dawa  0.282 -0.179 -0.178 -0.257 0.252 -0.275 -0.168 -0.084
(2.72)**  (1.66) (1.36) (1.89) (2.44)* (2.56)* (1.31) (0.62)
Jimma  -0.151  0.068 -0.059 0.232 -0.252 0.011 -0.076 0.432
(1.22)  (0.61) (0.46) (1.75) (2.03)* (0.10) (0.61) (3.23)**
Mekele  -0.191  0.079 0.180 0.125 -0.309 0.211 0.227  0.185
(1.00)  (0.43) (0.94) (0.56) (1.61) (1.17) (1.21) (0.81)
Year of observation (reference=2000): 
  1995  -0.096  0.062 0.095 0.038 -0.089 0.057 0.092  0.037
(1.49)  (0.93) (1.21) (0.48) (1.40) (0.87) (1.19) (0.46)
  1997  -0.586  0.422 0.296 0.064 -0.553 0.407 0.292  0.055
(7.67)**  (5.68)** (3.38)** (0.72) (7.29)** (5.48)** (3.37)** (0.61)
  2004  -0.523  0.279 0.407 0.180 -0.464 0.259 0.386  0.171
(5.71)**  (3.16)** (4.04)** (1.80) (5.12)** (2.94)** (3.82)** (1.71)
Constant  -1.782  -1.269 -1.978 -2.673 -1.447 -0.092 -1.563 -3.019
(12.22)**  (8.76)** (12.25)** (15.18)** (9.82)** (0.58) (9.73)** (16.41)** 
Observations  7796  7796 7796 7796 7796 7796 7796  7796 
Individuals  1949  1949 1949 1949 1949 1949 1949  1949 
Log likelihood  -1335  -1309 -915 -884 -1358 -1329 -940  -879 









          [ s.e.(σa  )]  0.045 0.056 0.071 0.072 0.040 0.048 0.053  0.071
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses
* Significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%   33
 
                           Table 6: Estimates of dynamic random effects probits of current employment status,
                                       Wooldridge's estimator, 1997-2004 and 1994-2000
                          Current employment status=Y it
        1997-2004       1994-2000
Unemployed  Informal Self- Public Unemployed Informal Self- Public 
sector  employed sector sector employed  sector 
worker  worker worker worker 
(1)  (2)  (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Y  t-1  1.092 1.277  1.637 1.618 1.383 1.549 2.039  1.873 
(9.92)** (12.08)**  (11.93)** (11.29)** (6.86)** (7.46)** (6.09)** (5.78)**
Y  1994  1.202 1.340  1.256 1.357 1.925 1.906 1.632  1.945 
(10.38)**  (12.29)**  (8.86)** (9.16)** (9.39)** (9.13)** (4.85)** (5.95)**
Female  -0.060 0.085  0.134 0.023 -0.074 0.098 0.161  0.050 
(0.97) (1.34) (1.75) (0.30) (1.17) (1.51) (2.04)*  (0.61)
Married  -0.531 0.240  0.125 0.110 -0.515 0.418 0.249  0.008 
(3.24)** (1.60) (0.76) (0.67) (2.40)* (2.11)* (1.11) (0.03)
Age 30-44  -0.257 0.067  -0.090 0.558 -0.135 -0.045 -0.218 0.667 
(1.96)*  (0.51) (0.56) (3.76)** (0.81) (0.26) (1.02) (3.36)**
Age 45-54  -0.373 -0.165  -0.175 0.613 -0.277 0.004 -0.121 0.747 
(1.59) (0.80) (0.77) (2.73)** (0.88) (0.02) (0.40) (2.44)* 
Age  55-64 -0.003 -0.037  0.020 0.331 -0.098 0.067 0.101  0.759 
(0.01) (0.13) (0.07) (0.94) (0.20) (0.18) (0.25) (1.70)
Completed schooling (reference group=no formal education)
Primary 0.071 -0.026  -0.339 -0.143 -0.312 0.053 -0.360 0.144 
(0.50) (0.21) (2.29)* (0.88) (1.77) (0.35) (1.85) (0.64)
Secondary 0.512 -0.485  -0.183 -0.150 0.487 -0.733 -0.291 -0.210
(3.27)** (3.31)**  (1.00) (0.87) (2.48)* (3.88)** (1.15) (0.85)
Some tertiary  -0.037 -0.833  -0.719 0.465 0.547 -0.839 -1.078 0.108 
(0.15) (3.47)**  (2.46)* (2.05)* (1.74) (2.75)** (2.84)** (0.33)
Ethinicity/ religion  dummies  Yes Yes Yes  Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Location  dummies  Yes Yes Yes  Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies  Yes Yes Yes  Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time (or group) means of 
time varying characteristics 
Marital status  Yes Yes Yes  Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Age groups  Yes Yes Yes  Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Schooling  Yes Yes Yes  Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Occupation  Yes Yes Yes  Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant  -1.497 -0.855  -1.587 -2.497 -1.957 -1.435 -2.149 -2.659
(9.25)** (5.41)**  (9.13)** (13.12)** (11.74)** (8.75)** (11.84)**  (12.92)** 
Observations  4484 4484  4484 4484 7125 7125 7125  7125 
Individuals)  2242 2242  2242 2242 2375 2375 2375  2375 
Log likelihood  -1132  -1130  -799 -775 -1005 -1003 -698 -609 
     estimate of σ a 9.1*10






-4  9.1*10 
-4 
          [ s.e.(σ a  )]  0.052 0.070  0.087 0.089 0.063 0.065 0.083  0.095 
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses 
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%   34
                 Table 6 :  Maximum Likelihood Estimation of Probit Model of Unemployment
Age group 15-64 only
Initial selection equation  Dynamic selection equation by year of observation
  by year of observation
1994 2000 1997 2000 2004 2004








Female -0.039 -0.071 0.106 -0.207 -0.022 0.125
(0.73) (1.33) (0.78) (2.13)* (0.18) (1.37)
Married1994 -0.761 -0.338 -0.282 -0.381
(10.47)** (1.61) (1.88) (2.06)*
Married2000 -0.650 -0.380
(8.86)** (2.54)*
Age groups (reference group=Age 15-19):
Age 30-44 -0.599 -0.547 -0.180 -0.238 -0.502 -0.354
(9.50)** (8.71)** (1.00) (2.14)* (3.75)** (3.46)**
Age 45-54 -0.759 -0.678 0.262 -0.276 -0.737 -0.729
(6.64)** (6.08)** (1.00) (1.52) (3.37)** (4.01)**
Age  55-64 -0.915 -0.837 -0.000 -0.414 -0.728 -0.828
(4.87)** (4.53)** (0.00) (1.44) (2.23)* (2.56)*
Education (reference group=no formal 
 schooling or primary incomplete):
Primary school completed 0.709 -0.265 0.062 0.138 0.048 -0.358
(9.60)** (2.18)* (0.28) (0.94) (0.25) (1.61)
Secondary school completed 1.187 -0.246 0.572 0.120 0.118 -0.137
(16.60)** (1.93) (2.26)* (0.70) (0.54) (0.46)
Some tertiary education 0.123 0.145 0.318 -0.842 0.037 -1.014
(1.04) (1.03) (1.03) (2.90)** (0.14) (2.88)**
C i t y  d u m m i e s Y e sY e sY e sY e sY e sY e s
Ethnicity and religion dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Paternal education dummies Yes Yes No No No No
Paternal occupation dummies Yes Yes No No No No
Constant -0.692 -0.577 -2.304 -1.197 -0.418 -0.980
(5.21)** (4.63)** (6.10)** (4.60)** (1.30) (3.74)**
Observations 3312 3138 1430 1228 726 1253
Log likelihood -1540 -1561 -218 -474 -301 -536
Pseudo R-squared 0.26 0.18 0.76 0.29 0.18 0.21
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%  35
Table 7 : Earnings and Selection into the Private and Public Sectors of Wage Employment: 2004
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Public Private Log Selection 
sector log sector log monthly  into public
monthly monthly earnings sector 
earnings earnings in  2004 in  2004
in 2004 in 2004 (Probit)
Female -0.214 -0.388 -0.302 -1.891
(3.22)** (4.49)** (5.60)** (7.21)**
Married -0.020
(0.12)
Log age 5.361 4.085 3.961 -9.877
(1.66) (1.89) (2.34)* (1.80)
Log age squared -0.678 -0.485 -0.468 1.621
(1.50) (1.58) (1.95) (2.08)*
Education (reference=no formal schooling):
Grades 1 to 10 0.338 0.157 0.254 -1.746
(2.42)* (1.21) (2.74)** (5.66)**
Preparatory school 0.687 0.281 0.457 -4.095
(4.70)** (2.01)* (4.61)** (7.49)**
Some tertiary education 1.077 0.769 0.886 -3.021
(7.07)** (4.31)** (7.93)** (6.38)**
Own occupation  (reference=unskilled workers):
Professional or technical 0.251 0.822 0.466 6.654
(2.37)* (4.95)** (5.27)** (10.39)**
Admin or clerical 0.207 0.334 0.286 0.967
(1.86) (2.63)** (3.52)** (5.15)**
Skilled production worker 0.292 0.482 0.426 1.777
(2.72)** (4.29)** (5.55)** (7.82)**
Public2004 0.492
(4.64)**




Selectivity term 1 -0.180
(2.27)*
Selectivity term 2 0.088
(0.62)
Constant -4.669 -2.532 -2.630 18.126
(0.81) (0.68) (0.89) (1.85)
City dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Ethnicity dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Religion dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 291 312 603 603
R-squared 0.49 0.45 0.51
Log likelihood -286
Pseudo R-squared  0.31
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%    36
Table 8: Earnings and Selection into the Private and Public Sectors of Wage Employment: 20000
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Public Private Log Selection 
sector log sector log monthly  into public
earnings monthly earnings sector 
in 2000 earnings  in 2000 in 2000
in 2000 (Probit)
Female -0.180 -0.465 -0.321 -1.745
(2.21)* (4.44)** (4.78)** (2.01)*
Married 0.200
(1.38)
Log age -0.978 -0.023 -0.194 2.798
(1.46) (0.08) (0.73) (0.95)
Log age squared 7.745 0.497 1.872 -22.031
(1.60) (0.23) (0.98) (0.99)
Education (reference=no formal schooling):
Grades 1 to 10 -0.304 0.217 0.047 4.217
(2.22)* (1.67) (0.49) (2.68)**
Preparatory school 0.089 0.411 0.343 2.952
(0.64) (2.65)** (3.21)** (2.96)**
Some tertiary education 0.350 1.344 0.763 8.257
(2.35)* (6.27)** (6.11)** (2.74)**
Own occupation 
(reference=unskilled worker): 0.755 0.862 0.842 1.572
Professional or technical (5.90)** (4.03)** (7.46)** (4.13)**
0.334 0.601 0.461 2.564
Admin or clerical (2.83)** (3.76)** (4.68)** (3.15)**
0.319 0.499 0.434 1.249
Skilled production worker (2.57)* (4.56)** (5.20)** (2.29)*
Public2000  0.401
(3.76)**




Selectivity term 1 -0.070
(0.83)
Selectivity term 2 0.072
(0.55)
Constant -9.554 3.470 0.877 38.011
(1.09) (0.92) (0.26) (0.94)
city dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
ethnicity dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
religion dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 291 289 580 580
R - s q u a r e d 0 . 4 60 . 5 10 . 4 7
Log likelihood -297
Pseudo R-squared 0.26
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
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Table 9 : Earnings and Selection into the Private and Public Sectors of Wage Employment: 1997
(3) (4) (5) (6)
Public Private Log Selection 
sector log sector log monthly  into public
monthly monthly earnings sector 
earnings earnings in  1997 in  1997
in 1997 in 1997 (Probit)
Female -0.245 -0.508 -0.375 0.492
(3.50)** (4.31)** (5.82)** (2.49)*
Married 0.367
(2.96)**
Log age 6.035 8.117 8.072 16.900
(2.04)* (2.89)** (4.12)** (4.39)**
Log age squared -0.767 -1.089 -1.069 -2.251
(1.85) (2.73)** (3.86)** (4.12)**
Education (reference=no formal schooling):
Grades 1 to 10 -0.033 0.141 0.096 0.402
(0.25) (0.88) (0.94) (1.95)
Preparatory school 0.322 0.597 0.518 0.564
(2.22)* (3.12)** (4.40)** (2.11)*
Some tertiary education 0.585 1.084 0.782 1.024
(3.89)** (3.77)** (5.77)** (2.69)**
Own occupation (reference=unskilled workers):
Professional or technical 0.530 0.799 0.584 0.519
(5.27)** (3.69)** (5.91)** (2.07)*
Admin or clerical 0.384 0.439 0.430 0.088
(3.72)** (2.58)* (4.55)** (0.53)
Skilled production worker 0.322 0.461 0.409 -0.130





public sector wage premium1997 -0.268
(0.44)
Selectivity term 1 -0.200
(2.09)*
Selectivity term 2 0.164
(0.80)
Constant -6.299 -10.006 -32.604
(1.20) (2.05)* (4.85)**
city dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
ethnicity dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
religion dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 402 328 730 730
R-squared 0.35 0.37 0.39
Log likelihood -402
Pseudo R-squared 0.2
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%    38
Table 10: Earnings and Selection into the Wage Employment and Self Employment: 1997, 2000, and 2004
      Log annual sales in year    Log  annual wages in year  Structural (simple) probit of sele-
 ction into self-employment in year
1997 2000 2004 1997 2000 2004 1997 2000 2004
     (1)      (2)      (3)      (4)      (5)      (6)      (7)      (8)      (9)
Female 0.748 0.061 -0.129 -0.354 -0.294 -0.184 -4.009 -0.425 -0.009
(2.37)* (0.12) (0.22) (5.33)** (3.66)** (1.87) (12.11)** (2.91)** (0.05)
Married -0.038 -0.074 -0.146
(0.17) (0.49) (0.83)
Log age 0.939 -7.286 -20.522 9.818 3.017 9.216 33.008 13.515 76.826
(0.12) (0.68) (1.29) (4.73)** (1.32) (3.27)* (7.33)** (3.64)** (12.44)**
Log age squared -0.023 1.235 2.781 -1.291 -0.326 -1.171 -4.689 -1.993 -10.063
(0.02) (0.87) (1.30) (4.41)** (1.02) (2.96)* (7.28)** (3.89)** (12.15)**
Education (reference=no formal schooling):
Grades 1 to 10 0.398 0.281 1.412 0.187 -0.001 0.319 -0.818 -0.338 -2.853
(1.36) (0.68) (1.93) (1.78) (0.01) (2.28)* (2.89)** (2.22)* (10.07)**
Preparatory school 1.722 1.560 1.871 0.890 0.575 0.508 -3.078 -1.200 -3.440
(3.71)** (2.46)* (2.21)* (7.97)** (4.48)** (3.14)* (8.65)** (5.90)** (10.01)**
Some tertiary education 1.652 2.613 2.906 1.254 1.186 0.897 -1.633 -1.800 -5.526
(2.40)* (3.28)** (2.58)* (10.52)** (8.70)** (4.15)* (3.50)** (7.48)** (10.71)**
Self-employment 
earnings permium 3.601 1.271 2.734
(19.44)** (14.64)** (13.38)**
Selectivity term 1 -0.390 -0.569 0.060
(3.17)** (4.34)** (0.46)
Selectivity term 2 -0.111 -0.692 -0.630
(0.37) (1.66) (1.33)
Constant 5.092 18.032 47.048 -10.699 1.703 -9.869 -60.109 -21.993 -147.524
(0.36) (0.90) (1.60) (2.93)** (0.42) (1.99)* (7.72)** (3.28)** (12.71)**
city dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
ethnicity dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Father's education No No No No No No  No  No  No
Mother's education No No No No No No No No No
Father's occupation No No No No No No No No No
Observations 177 99 115 628 452 212 1748 750 507
R-squared 0.14 0.29 0.19 0.36 0.37 0.30
Log likelihood -80 -259 -183
Pseudo R-squared 0.93 0.45 0.47
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%  
 
 